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called upon the international community to prevent similar atrocities in the future. To this end, Gareth Evans and Mahmoud Sahnoun led an international effort to examine the responsibility of both a sovereign state and the international community to protect people from mass atrocities regardless of their geographic location. In so doing, Evans and Sahnoun reframed the basic notion of sovereignty, to wit: if a state fails in its responsibility to protect those people within its borders from mass atrocities, the state may not use sovereignty as a shield to prevent the international community from taking appropriate action. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect outlines, inter alia, the means by which the international community may legitimize coercive intervention otherwise deemed a violation of sovereignty. In its current, immature stage, the doctrine articulates some initial means by which the United Nations may legitimize coercive action; however, the United States should lead the international community to develop secondary means of legitimacy to fulfill the obligation to protect endangered people when the United Nations Security Council fails to authorize coercive intervention.
THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY: INTERVENTIONS UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The collective shame of the international community following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 1 spurred the United Nations (UN) to endorse the Responsibility to Protect doctrine at the 2005 United Nations World Summit. 2 More than a decade passed between the horrors of the machete wielding mobs hell-bent on genocide within
Rwanda's borders until the UN vote to formally adopt the principles within the Responsibility to Protect and its corresponding framework for implementation. The unanimity with which the World Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect seemed an encouraging, tentative step toward establishing a sense of global accountability to prevent the next Rwanda. While the international community's acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect marks significant progress toward protection of civilians, much work remains. The doctrine consists of a continuum designed to prevent atrocities, react when they occur, and rebuild once they are resolved. This paper examines the second prong of the Responsibility to Protect, namely, the duty of the international community to take positive action upon the onset of atrocities and the legitimate means under which the international community may intervene.
All nations have an interest in preventing atrocities and restoring peace if prevention fails; however, the United States bears a unique burden of leadership in the current uni-polar world. Because of the United States' military and economic supremacy, it continues to dominate global discussions on many international issues.
The current administration has embraced a multilateral approach to resolving conflict around the world striving to share the burden of conflict prevention and military intervention with other nations. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) refers to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities as one of the "key challenges requiring broad global cooperation." 3 Although all nations within the international community share the burden to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, the United States should lead the discussion in the area of the Responsibility to Protect and shape the dialogue Approximately one year later, the Security Council failed to pass a similar resolution vis-à-vis the situation in Syria when China and Russia both vetoed the measure. 7 Soon thereafter, the United Nations General Assembly addressed the issue separately and voted overwhelmingly to remind Syria of its Responsibility to Protect ordinary inhabitants, including those residing within the sovereign territory of Syria. 8 Unfortunately, given the tensions between Russia, China, and the other three Security
Council Members, it appears likely that future situations will occur in which the Security Council will not reach consensus to invoke the Responsibility to Protect. 9 The recent veto vis-à-vis Syria demonstrated the need for the international community to identify alternate means to authorize military intervention. To that end, the United States should consider identifying additional means to legitimize procedures under which the international community could take coercive action within a sovereign state's borders. If the United States does not assume the lead in this area, it risks yielding the ability to shape the dialogue in a manner consistent with its national interests. Shifting momentum in the international community is always a difficult task; however, given the sensitivity of this particular subject, the difficulty will grow and risk leaving the United
States on the sideline of one of the most critical issues facing civilians around the world.
Last year, the international community dealt with Libya; 10 this year, it deals with Syria. 11 In the future, similar situations will develop in other areas of the world whether in Nigeria, the Philippines, or elsewhere. In the 2010 annual threat assessment to Congress, the Director of National Intelligence noted the threat of future genocides, The ICISS built a solid foundation for acceptance, among all Members of the United Nations, for the narrow principles contained in the Responsibility to Protect. To achieve universal agreement, the ICISS precisely defined instances in which the Responsibility to Protect could be invoked. Furthermore, the ICISS sought to clearly articulate that the Responsibility to Protect consisted of a continuum of actions for which the international community bore responsibility. The first action focused on the obligation to prevent the atrocities. The second action outlined the instances in which reaction and coercive intervention would be appropriate. The final action iterated the obligation to rebuild those institutions that had been depleted or destroyed as a result of coercive intervention. 20 The core of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine holds first, that the traditional notion of sovereignty cannot serve as a shield by which a government permits or actually conducts specified atrocities against people within that state. 21 Second, the doctrine holds that the international community bears a responsibility to take action to protect civilians from mass murder, ethnic cleansing, or genocide irrespective of the geographic location of those civilians. 22 In its report, the ICISS noted the understandable concern any state might have in conceding that another entity like the UN could legitimately approve the use of armed intervention within another state's sovereign territory. Mindful that "[m]ilitary intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure," 23 the ICISS established a baseline or "Just
Cause Threshold" before the international community could legitimately consider military force. The "Just Cause Threshold" requires that
[t]here must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur…[whether] large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale 'ethnic cleansing' actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. 24 The ICISS limited the sets of circumstances to the aforementioned in order to address the concerns of less powerful states who feared that more broadly defined circumstances could provide a legal carte blanche for a more powerful state to overrun a less powerful government. 25 Indeed, the ICISS "resisted any temptation to identify as a ground for military intervention human rights violations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing" 26 and did so intentionally in order to build the broadest basis of support. Ultimately, the international community concurred with these narrow categories for which coercive intervention might serve as a viable option. During the course of the ICISS's discussions and panels, various members of the international community lobbied for broader bases to authorize intervention such as "HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters." However, unanimity of agreement on the Responsibility to Protect could only be achieved when the criteria were limited to the situations of mass murder, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. 27 As noted earlier, the 2005 United Nations World Summit spoke with one voice when it unanimously endorsed the principles of the "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." 28 Specifically, the General Assembly adopted the following:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a caseby-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (emphasis added). 29 Both the ICISS and the UN recognized the inherent tension that exists in this concept of the dual responsibility of sovereignty. The ICISS identified the need to strike a balance between the Responsibility to Protect and international law's respect for territorial borders, 30 both customarily and in the UN Charter. 31 Correspondingly, the ICISS identified four precautionary principles required before the international community may legitimately authorize military intervention.
Given that a state or alliance's decision to use force to inflict its will upon another sovereign will cause some degree of harm to those in the targeted state as well as the intervenors, the international community should view military intervention as an option of practicable last resort. The ICISS identified four concepts to examine before applying force to protect a population. Those four principles include (1) the right intention of the intervenors, (2) no less effective means exist to prevent or halt atrocities,
proportionate military intervention, and (4) the coercive intervention has a reasonable prospect of success. 32 The intervenors must have as their "primary purpose…to halt or avert human suffering" 33 but the doctrine does not require that it be the only reason for taking action. Arguably, some intervenors may have secondary motives to act but so long as their primary goal is to alleviate human suffering, they may act even in the absence of a 'pure heart.' As a counter-balance, the ICISS specifically noted that the Responsibility to Protect should not be used as an excuse for a powerful state to overrun a less powerful state. 34 The ICISS explained that human rights violations short of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or large-scale loss of life 35 Regarding the second principle, the doctrine requires that, as a practical matter, nothing short of military intervention will prevent or halt the suffering. 38 This standard does not require the international community to try every other option in some formulaic manner before intervening militarily -it recognizes unique circumstances will exist in each case and the fluidity of the situation will determine the appropriate course of action. 39 Akin to a consequentialist approach, intervenors should act only if their intervention will prevent more harm than it will cause. They must be reasonably sure that the "[atrocities will be] severe enough so that the consequences [of military action] are likely to be better -or at least not worse -than those that would have occurred without intervention." 40 Next, the third principle requires that coercive intervention have a reasonable chance of success. If, for example, the Chinese government engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Uighurs to forcibly remove them from their native territory within China and the first three criteria were met, action under the Responsibility to Protect still would not be justified. In this example, the international community could not meet the fourth criteria because outside military intervention most likely would fail to keep the Uighurs safe given the remoteness of the territory, China's military might, and the depth of China's strategic forces. If the "Just Cause Threshold" has been satisfied and the precautionary principles have been met, the international community must then find the "right authority" to legitimize the military intervention under the Responsibility to Protect.
To establish stringent standards by which the international community could intervene militarily within the sovereign borders of a state, the ICISS identified the Security Council as the only body which could legitimately authorize such intervention. 41 Indeed, the ICISS noted that "[t]he criteria have to be tough, because the action proposed is itself extreme: military intervention means not only an intrusion into a sovereign state, but an intrusion involving the use of deadly force, on a potentially massive scale." 42 The ICISS followed by asking, "whose right is it to determine in any particular case, whether a military intervention for human protection purposes should go ahead?" 43 After examining the issue in detail, 44 the ICISS ultimately determined that only the Security Council could take such action. 45 The ICISS deserves great credit for establishing the Responsibility to Protect and securing unanimity of the United Nations
Members to accept the dual-notion of sovereignty and the criteria for military intervention; however, the time has come to reassess the means by which coercive intervention may be authorized. Given the continuing polarization among the Permanent Five Members of the Security Council, the international community should explore alternate means through which it may legitimize the use of force to halt genocide, mass murder, or ethnic cleansing. [t]he United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect." In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and -in certain instances -military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities. Responsibility to Protect situation. Powerless to enforce any other standard, the ICISS strongly encouraged the Permanent Five to pledge to withhold a veto. Because the Permanent Five did not affirmatively support the pledge, the moment for doing so has now effectively passed given Russia and China's recent veto vis-à-vis Syria. 56 A pledge from the Permanent Five now would require Russia and China to admit an error in judgment, and it is highly unlikely that either country will risk concessions which others might perceive as weakness.
Alternate Means to Obtain Legitimacy for Intervention
In light of the current situation, the United States may cease, temporarily at least, presenting Responsibility to Protect resolutions to the United Nations Security Council in the future and assess other mechanisms to obtain international legitimacy for intervention. To that end, the United States, in its role as a global leader, has a number of options to evaluate, some of which include those outlined by Richard Falk in his article "Legality and Legitimacy,"
[t]he Security Council is encouraged strongly to discharge its responsibilities, but if it fails to do so, then action may be taken by a descending hierarchy of empowered actors: the General Assembly, regional and sub-regional actors, and finally, 'concerned states'. …the main point is that external actors have an obligation to act in a timely and effective fashion. Assembly demonstrated the concern of the international community for the people in Syria, the resolution stopped short of calling for any type of coercive action to intervene on behalf of those under attack by the Syrian government. In essence, the General Assembly's resolution informed the Syrian regime that the global community did not approve of the regime's action but did not have the collective means to do more than assert disapproval.
As noted earlier, under current interpretation of the UN Charter, the General Assembly lacks the legal authority to authorize the use of military force. Therefore, in the absence of an amendment to the UN Charter, General Assembly resolutions lack the coercive means to force any type of compliance. In this particular instance, the Syrian government did not heed the concerns of the General Assembly and has continued with its apparently indiscriminate shelling against geographic pockets of the population within Syria. 61 Presuming that the United Nations will not amend its Charter and that the legal interpretations that the General Assembly lacks the ability to authorize military action, the United States should not expect a General Assembly resolution alone to serve as an independent means of the "right authority" for military intervention under the Responsibility to Protect. At most, the United States might consider a General Assembly resolution as an "amber light" to proceed with forming a coalition outside of the United Nations itself. 62 Option Two. Regional Organizations with Geographic Stakes. Under this second option, the United States may contemplate a two-prong approach to obtain the "right authority." Under the first prong, the United States could turn to a UN recognized regional organization for support. 63 The regional organization would be in the geographic location of the state in which the civilian population faces mass killing or ethnic cleansing. In a Philippines based scenario, the United States would turn to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 64 for the "right authority." Tellingly, the UN Secretary-General envisions a greater role for regional and sub-regional organizations across the Responsibility to Protect continuum, noting that
[s]tates and civil society groups that are closer to the events on the ground may have access to more detailed information, may have a more nuanced understanding of the history and culture, may be more directly affected by the consequences of action taken or not taken, and may be critical to the implementation of decisions taken in New York. 65 The report does not detail specified means of determining the "right authority" within regional organizations, recognizing that "one size" will not fit all situations. 66 Nevertheless, the Secretary-General reminded the Member states and the regional organizations of the moral imperative to intervene on behalf of those faced with mass killings or ethnic cleansing. Specifically, the report states,
Context matters. The responsibility to protect is a universal principle. Its implementation, however, should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region. Each region will operationalize this principles at its own pace and in its own way. I would encourage intraregional dialogue among government officials, civil society representatives, and independent experts on how to proceed, such as the Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Regional, as well as global, ownership is needed. But make no mistake: each region must move forward, step by step, to ensure that populations are more protected and that the risk of mass atrocity crimes recedes with each passing year (emphasis added). 67 Under a regional organizational approach focused on the people of a sovereign state located within that geographic region, a super-majority vote by members to authorize military intervention would be required. When the country of interest falls within the geographic location of the regional organization, then the concerned nations might consider requiring a two-thirds majority vote from the members of the regional organization. 68 Next, those regional organization members voting for military intervention should specify their troop and financial contributions to the proposed intervention, identify exit criteria, and pledges of financial support to the affected sovereign state following resolution of the hostilities. The pledges of troop and financial contributions will demonstrate to the international community the political will of the regional organization to halt the atrocities, thus helping to identify the ways and means for accomplishing the ends. Furthermore, the requirement to identify exit criteria and pledges of support after the cessation of the atrocities will instill a more disciplined and reasoned approach to the feasibility of intervention and likelihood of success. means by which to seek alternate legitimization for intervention in order to act quickly and decisively to save those targeted civilians at the mercy of the state in which they reside. To do less is to ignore the shameful lessons of the past.
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